Working Papers
Distance to Schools and Equal Access in School Choice Systems [paper]
Revision requested, Journal of Public Economics
This paper studies the impact of geography on cross-racial access to schools under school choice systems. Using data from Boston Public Schools, I show that white prekindergarteners are assigned to schools that are rated higher using measures of test-score levels, test-score growth, and race-balanced growth, than Black students; and that cross-race school-rating gaps under choice are no lower than would be generated by a neighborhood assignment rule. I find that longer commutes to high-rated schools reduce access for Black students. Consistent with a more favorable geography; Hispanic students, on the other hand, sort toward high-growth and race-balanced growth schools under choice.
Gains from Alternative Assignment? Evidence from a Two-Sided Teacher Market, with Elton Mykerezi, Aaron Sojourner, and Aradhya Sood [paper] - Under Review
The literature on assignment mechanisms largely focuses on efficiency based on agents' preferences, though policymakers may prioritize different goals. In assigning teachers to classrooms, a school district might prioritize student learning but must also consider teacher welfare. This paper studies the potential gains in student test scores from alternative within-district assignments of teachers to classrooms, using novel administrative data on teacher and school principal decisions from the district's internal transfer system (ITS) and student test scores under the observed assignments. To credibly predict student test scores under unrealized assignments, we jointly model student achievement and teacher and principal decisions, accounting for potential selection of teachers on test score gains. We estimate the variation in teachers' comparative advantage in producing learning to be one-ninth the magnitude of the variation in their general effectiveness. Further, teachers dislike comparative advantage-based assignments. Assignment of teachers to classrooms to maximize learning under the constraint of not reducing any assigned teacher's welfare would raise the average test score by 7% of a standard deviation (SD) relative to that under the observed assignment, with this effect driven mostly by assignment of teachers with higher general effectiveness to larger classrooms rather than by harnessing teachers' comparative advantage.
Selected Work in Progress
Disentangling School and Peer Effects: A Non-linear Approach with School Lotteries, with Minseon Park and Suk Joon Son
Targeting and Efficiency in the Allocation of Childcare Subsidies, with Minseon Park, Suk Joon Son, and Esperanza Johnson
This project studies the trade-off between efficiency and redistribution in waitlist-based allocation systems applied to Massachusetts’ childcare subsidy program. The program allocates assistance through two mechanisms—vouchers that allow parental choice of providers and direct assignments to specific centers—creating natural variation in the degree of choice families face. Restricting choice may reduce match quality but can improve targeting if families with better outside options self-select out, while also encouraging provider expansion in lower-income areas by stabilizing funding. Using administrative data on all applicants and providers from 2015 to 2019, we quantify how variation in the degree of choice shapes both allocative efficiency and redistribution toward more disadvantaged families.